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I. INTRODUCTION
For several years health care reform proposals have had a prominent
position on the front pages of our daily newspapers and in our nightly
newscasts. Although the future of these proposals is uncertain, concern over
the nation's system for delivering health care will persist and provoke debate
over the creation of substantive rights to health care. However, there are
important procedural issues that seem to get lost in the debate. These include
questions about how courts, administrative agencies, private arbitrators,
institutional ethics committees, etc., should be used to settle controversies
between providers, insurers, patients and health plan subscribers over the
enforcement of those rights. Despite the absence of discussion of these
procedural questions, it seems clear that the disposition of patient and provider
1Associate Professor, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. The
author is grateful for the excellent assistance in writing this article provided by
Christopher Bowes, a student and research assistant at Cardozo School of Law.
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claims will greatly affect not only the lives of millions of people and the
functioning of state and federal courts,2 but also the formation of substantive
health policy. This article suggests that we begin to construct an analytic
framework based in legal process theory and health policy analysis within
which to evaluate mechanisms for resolving individual claims to health care
and treatment.
If health care reform legislation, on the state or federal level, transforms our
predominantly private health system into a more public one, the dispute
resolution procedure mandated by legislation or administrative regulations
will become an increasingly important mechanism through which public
health care policy is formulated. Substantive decisions made by hospitals,
insurers, administrative agencies and courts in resolving individual
controversies about who gets what health care, at whose expense, will
gradually establish much of our nation's health care policy. This policy,
developed on a case-by-case basis, will be every bit as important to the
achievement of the reform's objectives as the policy embodied in legislation or
administrative regulations.
Although some health care reform legislation may be enacted on the federal
level, increasing attention is being given to state reforms. Many of the national
proposals anticipate that the states will play a major role in shaping their health
care systems within a national framework of goals and limitations.3 Already,
more than seven states have enacted major health care reforms without waiting
for direction from the federal government.4 Given this new role over the next
several years, state as well as federal legislators, regulators, insurers, and
providers who have authority under reform legislation to locate and design
adjudicatory institutions will have to choose among the process options, the
theoretical foundations, and the ethical models available. They will need some
guidance.
Yet, policy makers have no theory of process5 upon which to decide which
institutions and procedural models should be used to settle the array of health
care claims that will arise. It appears that in an effort to get the substance right,
policy makers have paid little attention to process. Even though all of the health
2 The Federal Judicial Conference has recently expressed concern over the potential
of national health care reform to overload the court with litigation seeking to enforce
new rights to medical benefits which reform legislation could create. See Robert Pear,
U.S. Judges Warn of Health Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, August 16, 1994 at A13. See also Judicial
Conference Adopts Principles for Health Care Reform, 26 THE THIRD BRANCH, No. 8, August
1994, at 1-2.
3 Richard Kronick, Where Should the Buck Stop: Federal and State Responsibilities In
Health Care Financing Reform, 12 HEALTH AFFAIRS at 87 (Supp. 1993).
4 Symposium on State Health Care Reform, 12 HEALTH AFFAIRS 7 (Summer 1993).
5As used here, "process" means the forums, decision makers and rules of procedure
used to define issues, control participation and resolve health care disputes. A "theory
of process," means the abstract principles and values upon which particular procedures
or procedural models depend.
[Vol. 8:201
NEED FOR A PROCESS THEORY
care reform proposals recently debated in Congress sought to provide
universal access to health care for all Americans (though not necessarily
universal coverage), few proposals set forth the procedures through which
these new individual rights to access could be claimed. Moreover, policy
makers have few analytic tools with which to choose from among the dispute
resolution alternatives open to them. While some health care reform proposals
have provisions for enforcement of the entitlements they create, none appear
to base such processes on a principled, coherent analysis of the procedural
options available.
This essay sets out a preliminary, theoretical framework within which to
analyze remedial options and begin the search for the values they promote. It
is based on the premise that the process used to enforce substantive rights to
health care should promote values that are consistent with, and even
supportive of, the values that health care reform itself would promote. The
framework proceeds upon an analysis of the kinds of claims at issue, the
alternative decision making models available to settle them, and the forums in
which those models might be used. In conclusion, I urge scholars, policy
makers and practitioners to consider procedural as well as substantive issues
in developing health care reform proposals so that the implementation of new
rights will support the objectives of health care reform.
Under the present system (or non-system), individual patient and provider
complaints raising issues about access to treatment, the quality of care and the
cost of health services are adjudicated in a bewildering legal matrix of forums
and procedures. Often the issues in these disputes are defined in terms of claims
to legal rights and are resolved by courts.6 But courts are not the only forums
available and their formal rules of evidence and civil procedure are not the only
standards which can be used to resolve such claims. Individual claims brought
under the new legislation will have to be settled in some forum-private,
administrative or judicial-that is given jurisdiction over them under the new
system. Currently, policy makers must create the forums and procedures for
resolving these claims without suitable analytic tools or sufficient information
upon which to base their judgments. In the absence of factual information
about the effect of various resolution procedures upon the outcome of disputes,
I suggest that we look to theoretical models described in legal and health policy
literature to develop a framework within which to construct a new system for
the resolution of health care claims.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Only a limited amount of empirical data is available to policy makers about
the effects of different adjudication models on the substance of resulting
6The disposition of claims to health care as legal entitlements is cogently discussed
in Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reforn, and the Reconstruction of American
Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POLMCS, POL'Y & L. 439, 444-68 (1993).
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decisions.7 Such empirical information is difficult to gather because so many
variables affect adjudicatory decisions. These variables include, but are not
limited to, the number of parties, their dealings with each other, the economic
and other consequences of various outcomes, the procedures used to resolve
their disputes and the nature of the decision makers. Where there is data
showing an association between certain procedural variables (e.g., the
requirement of a written decision) and certain outcomes (e.g., decisions in favor
of the status quo), it should be taken into account in designing patient dispute
resolution. Very little such information is available.
On the other hand, there is a considerable body of literature describing the
effect of legal procedure on substantive decisions that is based on impression,
anecdote, philosophical analysis, and insight. This literature seeks to determine
the theoretical basis for various kinds of decision making processes. That is, it
describes the claims processes used by public and private insurers, alternative
dispute resolution, administrative procedure, and the judicial process in an
effort to identify the moral, economic, and jurisprudential principles and
values that underlie them. 8 The insights provided by this literature can serve
as a useful starting point for an analysis of existing and proposed procedures
through which we might resolve health care disputes.9
In addition, there is a separate literature that seeks to identify the moral,
economic, and political underpinnings of national health policy.10 For example,
7 For an excellent discussion of the use of empirical approaches to the analysis of
administrative law issues see Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the "Chevron"
Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L. J. 984, 985-89
(1990); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, Studying Administrative Law: A Methodology
for and Report on, New Empirical Research, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 519,520-22 (1990).
8 See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44U. CHI. L.REv. 28(1976) (discussing the inherent value of certain administrative
procedures, such as respect for individual dignity, apart from their instrumental value
in promoting accuracy) [hereinafter Due Process Calculus]. See also Philip J. Harter,
Negotiated Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 CEO. L. J. 1 (1982) (discussing economic
theory and its relation to the bargained for resolution of disputes); ROBERT P. WOLFF,
UNDERSTANDING RAWLS 195 (1977) (discussing the relationship between Rawls'
principles of justice and microeconomic theory); and RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 59 (1983) (discussing Rawls in relation to Kant and Bentham).
9 Bioethicists have recognized the absence of a theory of process for determining
patient treatment claims, and legal academics have shown renewed interest in process
theory regarding the way in which constitutional and other legal decisions are made.
For a discussion of bioethical concerns see Susan M. Wolf, Toward A Theory of Process,
20 LAW, MED. AND HEALTH CARE 278, 282-86 (1992). Legal process theory is discussed
in John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx. L. REV. 579 (1984); Robert S.
Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Process--A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL
L. REV. 1 (1974); and Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of
Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721 (1991).
10See generally, ELI GINZBERG, HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH: KEY TO HEALTH POLICY
(1991); Margaret C. Farrell, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Regulation of Health Care, 1
BIOLAW 333 (1987).
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health policies that promote informed consent rest heavily upon philosophical
and ethical principles of individual autonomy and rationality." A synthesis of
these two discourses, legal process theory and health policy analysis, can be
used to fashion a new theoretical framework within which to evaluate options
for the formulation of health policy through adjudication.
A. Allocative Decisions
To begin to define this theoretical framework, we can make a distinction
between aggregate consumer claims for more health care services in relation to
other goods and services (how big the health care pie should be) and individual
claims for treatment (who should get a piece). A logical starting point is the
premise that in this world of limited resources one of the major functions of
any new health care system will be to ration health care.12 Rationing can be
conceived of as requiring decisions on two levels. First, as a society, we must
make "allocative decisions" about how much of our social resources will be
devoted to health care and how much to other goods and services.
In a free enterprise system, most allocative decisions are made invisibly by
participants in capital markets who seek to maximize their profits and
preferences by directing resources to their most valued use, including health
care. 13 Sometimes, however, such allocative decisions are made collectively
through government regulation rather than by individuals participating in
markets. For example, in an effort to control health care expenditures some
states control investment in health care facilities through their certificate of
need programs rather than letting market forces dictate such investment. 14
Health care reform proposals are largely concerned with collective allocative
decisions to be made through government regulations mandating health
benefits, compelling insurance coverage, and capping aggregate health care
expenditures.
B. Distributive Decisions
In rationing health care, we must also make "distributive decisions" about
who will receive the aggregate resources we have allocated to health care.15
llSee generally JAMES BEAucHAmps & RUTH FADEN, THE HISTORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT, (1989).
12 See generally Symposium: The Law and Policy of Health Care Rationing: Models and
Accountability, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1505 (1992); Symposium, Rationing Health Care: Social,
Political and Legal Perspectives, 18 AM. J. L. & MED. 1 (1992).
13W. John Thomas, The Oregon Medicaid Proposal: Ethical Paralysis, Tragic Democracy,
and the Fate of a Utilitarian Health Care Program, 72 OR. L. REv. 1, 151-56 (1993).
14See generally James B. Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificate of Need Regulation
of Health Facilities to State Control, 19 IND. L. REv. 1025 (1986); Margaret G. Ewing (Farrell),
Health Planning and Deinstitu tionalization: Advocacy Within The Administrative Process, 31
STAN. L. REV. 679, 695-701 (1979).
1 5 See generally GUIO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBsrr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
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This allocation, in turn, depends on the distribution of wealth among
individual participants. The invisible hand provides more goods and services
to those with funds to purchase them than to those lacking such funds.
Individuals in a market system cannot claim a legal right to health care they
cannot afford. Under some health care reform proposals, for example President
Clinton's Health Security Act, access to health care would be provided to all at
an affordable premium (paid jointly by employees and employers) or a
subsidized premium (paid by government) for those without sufficient
funds. 16 Under such proposals, distributive claims-claims of individuals that
they are entitled to a piece of the pie-will consist largely of the claims of
individual patients who complain that they are not getting the kind, amount,
or duration of care they are entitled to receive.
Patients will make several kinds of distributive claims under newly
reformed health care systems that require determinations about how health
care resources are allocated. First, patients will claim that they are entitled to
different levels of insurance benefits, subsidies, co-payments, and deductibles.
For instance, most of the proposals would provide health insurance coverage
to poor people. Nevertheless, disputes will arise, as they do now under
Medicaid, over who is "poor" for this purpose within loosely defined legislative
parameters. Second, patients will claim a right to receive coverage for certain
specific health services. In the past, such claims have been largely decided by
indemnity insurance companies that determined whether the services were
"medically necessary" as required for insurance or Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement. 17
Under a reformed system, particularly one that relies on premium payments
to health plans, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs), patient
subscribers will not submit claims for payment as they do when they have
indemnity coverage. Instead they will ask the plan to provide certain treatment
because it is covered by the plan and is medically necessary. They will dispute
their plan physicians' decisions to (a) reduce treatment or (b) to reject the
patient's request for a particular treatment. Is care in an intensive care unit
"medically necessary" for the asthmatic individual who refuses efficacious but
disfiguring drug treatment? Is a woman with breast cancer entitled to receive,
on an experimental basis, bone marrow transplant treatment customarily used
only for patients with leukemia? Is an eighty year old man entitled to receive
an organ transplant when "medically necessary" transplants are covered by his
health plan? All of these situations raise difficult process and ethical questions
in which non-medical factors must be weighed to determine what is medically
necessary for coverage purposes. After the enactment of some form of universal
health care coverage, patients will base such individual claims to care on both
16The Health Security Act, H.R. 3600 Subtitle C. Part I 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
17Eleanor D. Kinney, The Role of Judicial Review Regarding Medicare and Medicaid
Program Policy: Past Experience and Future Expectations, 35 ST. Louis U. L. J. 759, 762
(1991).
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their statutory entitlement to mandatory coverage and their private insurance
contracts.18
Third, individuals will claim they are entitled to receive treatment of
particular quality.19 Patients who file malpractice claims may assert that under
new health care legislation they are entitled to a standard of care different, and
perhaps higher and more expensive, than that embodied in state tort law.20
Sometimes patients will claim they are entitled to use the services of certain
doctors, hospitals and clinics, particularly when these providers are especially
skilled in providing the care they need. In addition, patients will assert a right
to choose among equally efficacious treatments even when some are more
costly than others. For example, are parents of a cerebral palsied child entitled
to nurses and attendants necessary to care for her at home, or must the parents
accept less costly institutional care? Furthermore, patients or persons acting on
their behalf, will assert a right to refuse care. Can a competent adult with
neurological disorder claim a right to receive food and nutrition in the hospital
while refusing medication?21 Again, resolution of such questions requires an
ethical and rational process.
Finally, the legislative promotion of HMOs and other alternative delivery
systems that provide both insurance and health care services through a single
entity carries with it a number of financial effects. Such systems create financial
incentives for stricter distributive rationing and the withholding of costly
treatments that affect the quality of care patients receive. Can consumers claim
entitlement to the standard of care prevailing under state malpractice law that
is higher than that provided by federally sponsored HMOs meeting federal
18The Supreme Court has recently addressed the question of whether private parties
may assert a private right of action to enforce provisions of the Medicaid statute. See
Suter v. Artist M, 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992); Wilder v. Northern Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U. S.
498(1990).
19 See generally Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed
Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 CEo. WASH. L. REV. 181 (1990).
20Various health care reforms would also change current state malpractice law in
several ways. Some would impose limitations on the amount of recovery for
non-economic loss, eliminate punitive damages, and limit lawyers contingency fees. See
generally Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Lessons for Reform, 54 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROs.
Nos. 1 & 2 (Winter & Spring 1991). President Clinton's Health Security Act included
"enterprise liability" as a demonstration project. This approach would have made health
plans solely responsible for the malpractice of doctors and other health care personnel
working for the plans. See William M. Sage, Kathleen E. Hastings, Robert A. Berenson,
Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health Care Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J.
L. & MED. 1 (1994). See also Malpractice Symposium, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. No. 2
(Spring 1986); Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice "Crisis" of the 1970's: An
Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH & HOsP. L. 629 (1985).
21Cf. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986) (competent adult
entitled to receive treatment for pain, but can refuse life sustaining medical treatment,
including food and nutrition, from a public hospital).
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standards?22 In such a climate consumer claims will become a critically
important vehicle for the formation of health policy.
C. Decision Making Models
At least three models of adjudication are commonly used to make
distributive decisions about who gets how much of a given pie. In the
negotiation model, opposing parties agree on settlements by trading their
interests and bargaining to a result that each values more highly than the status
quo.23 This model, based on micro-economic concepts of efficiency and the
enhancement of value through exchange, is used in mediation offered or
required by some health plans and required in some courts before parties may
litigate their differences. In disputes between patients and health care
providers, bargaining can be distributive (dividing a finite pool of resources
among the parties) or integrative (open to the parties' adding new resources to
be divided among them).24 Both distributive and integrative bargaining
require trading interests to achieve equilibrium. Collective bargaining
agreements between organized labor and employers are an example.
In the collaborative model a variety of parties with different interests are
represented and resolution is reached through deliberation and consensus.25
Hospital ethics committees26 and some administrative agencies' proceedings
are examples.27 Some courts have utilized the collaborative model when
required to frame remedial orders in institutional reform litigation. For
example, courts have invited amicus participation by professional associations,
appointed special masters, and retained court appointed experts to bring
patient, medical, psychiatric, administrative and state perspectives to bear on
the question of how state mental institutions and prisons could meet their
22 See, e.g., FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, 719 (2d ed. 1991)
(discussing the unpublished opinion in Bush v. Dake, File No. 86- 25767, NM -2, Circuit
Court, County of Saginaw (Mich. 1989), in which an HMO's policy of paying plan
physicians funds remaining in "referral" account at end of year was challenged as
creating disincentives for proper referrals and good care, but was upheld as not contrary
to public policy).
2 3 See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GErrING TO YES (1981).
2 4 See generally WILLIAM URY, ET AL., GET7NG DISPUTES RESOLVED (1987).
2 5 See generally Margaret G. Farrell, Doing Unto Others: A Proposal for Participatory
Justice in Social Security's Representative Payee Program, 53 U. PITt. L. REV. 883 (1992)
(hereinafter Doing Unto Others); Hater, supra note 8, at 28.
261n re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (requiring that
the guardian of a comatose adult confer with the hospital ethics committee before
withdrawing life support).
2 7 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (previously the Negotiated Rule Making
Act of 1990), 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-590 (Supp. 1992) (establishing procedures to be used by
administrative agencies that choose to formulate proposed rules through a negotiated
rule making process in which affected parties participate).
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constitutional and statutory obligations to provide treatment.28 Many matters
which might have been litigated were settled when all participants concurred
in compromise solutions that the court had no authority to order.
The adversary model assumes a polarized, zero sum game in which one side
can win only to the extent that the other side loses.29 The model requires the
parties to provide evidence of relevant facts to a neutral, passive decision maker
who bases his or her decision exclusively on the evidence submitted by the
parties and then applies the law (found in constitutions, statutes,
administrative rulings and judicial precedents) to the facts found. This model
is the one usually used by courts and, in modified form, by administrative
agencies. 30
It could be argued that the claims of patient/consumers for more, better or
specific treatment under a reformed health care system should not be resolved
exclusively by any one of the models discussed above. Rather, a mixture of the
models could be used so that different kinds of claims could be heard in
different forums using different decision making processes. However, it could
be hard, on a practical level, to classify claims for disposition through the
resolution model best suited to resolve them.
For instance, one basis upon which to differentiate claims could be the legal
basis or the legal cause of action asserted. Common law tort claims could be
tried in adversary proceedings in state courts while disputes involving
statutory entitlement would be heard initially in administrative proceedings.
Yet, because it is likely that several causes of action will be claimed in a single
dispute, cases cannot easily be allocated to various adjudicatory forums on the
basis of the source of the legal claim asserted. Alternatively, claims might be
differentiated on the basis of the parties involved, with claims against private
plans and providers resolved through alternative dispute resolution and claims
against the state and federal government addressed in administrative and
judicial proceedings. Again, because it is likely that many disputes will involve
both public and private actors, an allocation of jurisdiction based on the
identity of the parties would be problematic. Finally, claim size could be used
as a criterion for the allocation of disputes to small claims courts, state courts
and federal courts, as well as within administrative agencies (e.g., Medicare
28 See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);
Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975) (records of the Dixon Monitoring
Committeeare maintained and on file at the Mental Health Law Project, 1101 15thStreet,
N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005); see also Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law
Remedies, 79 CEO. L. J. 1355 (1991) (arguing in favor of the legitimacy of a deliberative
model of remedial decision making); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHAN,
BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPTrEs 27
(1987).
2 9 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 382-84
(1978).
30See Margaret C. Farrell, Revisiting Roe v. Wade: Substance and Process in the
Abortion Debate, 68 IND. L. J. 269, 282-92 (1992).
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Part A and Part B appeals). Such differentiation seems inappropriate where
some claims will be for injunctive relief and others will involve small amounts
of money but significant personal values. Unless some differentiating criteria
can be found that can be economically and feasibly administered, a unitary
system should be considered.
D. Process Values
In designing a claims system based on any of the models discussed, policy
makers should be aware that each of the models furthers certain values, either
instrumental values or intrinsic values. Some process has "instrumental" value
in that it facilitates the accurate application of general, substantive rules to
particular facts. For example, in the adversary model, the requirement of notice
and opportunity to make written submissions permits the decision maker to
obtain information with which to accurately determine particular facts and
apply substantive rules to them.31
On the other hand, certain process can be said to have "intrinsic" value to the
participants. Thus, an opportunity to be present at a hearing and make an oral
statement enhances the participant's sense of dignity and respect for
government, apart from its instrumental ability to promote accurate
applications of law to facts. 32 In the negotiation model, court approved
settlements that are bargained for by the parties depend for their legitimacy on
principles of individual autonomy and freedom of contract, rather than
concepts of public law and justice.33 The consensus model can be seen as
grounded in intrinsic values of community, beneficence, rational deliberation,
and collective decision making.
A proper approach demands that each of the mechanisms that could be used
to resolve patient claims under new health reform legislation be analyzed to
identify the process values it promotes. These different process values should
then be evaluated to determine whether they further or retard the reform's
objectives.
31Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrruHONAL LAW, 1365 (2d ed. 1988).
32JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINisTRA-vE STATE 158-238 (1985);
Mashaw, Due Process Calculus, supra note 8, at 41-42. An eloquent discussion of this issue
is presented by Judge Patricia Wald in Cray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146,162-63
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
33 Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1085-86 (1984). See also Richard
B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193
(1982); Richard B. Stewart, Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1756 (1975).
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E. Substantive Health Policy Goals and Values
Health care reform is intended to further certain values such as autonomy,
equity, efficiency, and beneficence. 34 For instance, most health care reform
proposals are based on principles of patient autonomy and informed consent.
These values are furthered by the accumulation of, and access to, information
about the quality and outcomes of care. Similarly, equity among beneficiaries
in the form of nationally uniform access, without regard to income or health
status, is furthered by affordable or mandated insurance, community rating,
and subsidies for low income individuals and small businesses. Efficiency is
promoted through the definition and containment of health care costs through
market incentives or direct regulation. Beneficence is reflected in the provision
of a uniform, broad package of comprehensive benefits to all subscribers.
Application of any given procedure will make the promotion of specific
health reform goals more or less likely. An ethics committee that does not
provide adequate notice or opportunity for patients to participate effectively
does not promote patient autonomy, but may permit the participation of other
persons with affected interests and so promote deliberation and the application
of community norms.35 An adversarial, malpractice proceeding may respect
the autonomy and dignity of patients, but be institutionally incapable of
providing the decision maker with the economic information necessary to
make rational decisions about quality of care standards affecting the cost of
health care.36 Whatever process policy makers choose to incorporate in a new
health care system should be understood in relation to the values and health
care goals that the process itself will further or retard.
I. FORuMS FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Presently, patients may dispute decisions regarding their health care in many
different forums. They may make claims against doctors and hospitals, HMOs,
private insurers, and government agencies based on breach of contract,
statutory violations, or even deprivation of constitutional rights to certain
kinds of treatment.37 Sometimes consumer demands are made directly to
34 See generally NORMAN DANELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985).
35 See generally Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process, Nesting Rights in a
Community of Caring, 50 MD. L. REv. 798 (1991).
36For an example of judicial standard setting in the absence of basic economic
information see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (requiring glaucoma tests
for persons under 40 years old despite evidence that only one out of every 25,000 people
under age 40 develop the disease).
37 See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 US. 250 (1974)(holding that
withholding necessary medical care constituted an unconstitutional burden on the
exercise of an indigent's right to travel and striking down the state's durational
residency requirement for medical assistance payments); Owens v. Nacogdoches
County Hosp. Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (upholding indigent patient
statutory cause of action against hospital for violation of the "Anti-Dumping Act" when
hospital directed a pregnant patient to travel 200 miles to another hospital to deliver her
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providers, and they are decided by nursing home ombudsmen, hospital ethics
committees, and institutional grievance procedures. 38 Sometimes they are
made to HMOs, indemnity insurers, or self-insuring employers who provide
internal review and appeals procedures.39 In other circumstances, claims are
directed to government agencies administering public health programs, such
as Medicaid or Medicare, and are resolved in hearings before administrative
law judges and appeals councils.40 The relationship among these forums for
dispute resolution is complex.4 '
Under the major health care reform initiatives presently being considered
many private disputes between patients and providers or their insurers will be
transformed into public law issues. In these disputes, consumers will claim
new rights and entitlements arising under reform legislation. For example,
patients who believe their insurance companies have unfairly processed their
claims now use a private insurer's grievance procedure or bring bad faith
breach of contract actions in state court.4 2 Under a new system of mandatory,
publicly supported, federally regulated private health insurance, such
claimants might assert a federal cause of action in federal court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for deprivation under color of state law of their new right arising under
baby); Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975) (upholding confined mental
patient's right to medical treatment in facilities outside of their institution where such
treatment is consistent with the rehabilitative purposes of the Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill Act); Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz.
1984) (upholding mother's claim against hospital and physicians for enhancement of
injury where hospital transferred son to county hospital for surgery); Hiserv. Randolph,
617 P.2d 774 (Ariz. 1980) (reversing summary judgment in favor of hospital employed
physician who refused to provide treatment to a private patient where a substantial fact
issue existed as to whether a 40 minute delay occasioned by the physician's refusal, in
probability, proximately caused her death).
38 See generally John C. Fletcher, Ethics Committees and Due Process, 20 LAW, MED. AND
HEALTH CARE 291 (1992); Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and the Courts, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., 12 (June 1986).
39 5ee generally Frank P.James, The Experimental Treatment Exclusion Clause: A Tool for
Silent Rationing of Health Care? 12 J. LEGAL MED. 359 (1991).
40 Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) (upholding the constitutionality of the
Administrative Hearings procedure available under Part B of the Medicare program
which covers Supplementary Medical Costs); Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the Administrative Hearings procedures under the
Medicare program for resolving disputes involving less than one hundred dollars
violated the notice and opportunity to be heard requirements of the due process clause).
4 1See, e.g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
(1975).
42Such state tort law claims have been held preempted by ERISA when made against
employee benefit plans covered by ERISA. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41 (1987).
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a federal health care statute,43 requiring a reconciliation of the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and reform provisions.
Policy makers must consciously decide whether the newly claimed rights
should be enforced through adversarial proceedings in federal courts. In doing
so they should consider whether such process will further both desirable
process values (such as individual autonomy and respect for government) and
substantive values of health care reform (such as equity and beneficence), or
whether other forums are more appropriate for the resolution of some patient
disputes.44 The following alternative forums should be evaluated in terms of
the decision making models they use, the process values they promote, and
their ability to achieve the formulation of health policy consistent with the goals
of reform.
A. Informal Dispute Resolution
The initial consideration of patient claims for non-emergency medically
necessary treatment might take place in informal private or quasi-public
forums such as those provided by indemnity insurance companies, Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plans, HMOs, or other health plans. 45 In addition to the
claimant and the provider, the proceedings in these forums might involve
persons representing various other interests affected by the decision. The
disposition of claims regarding medical care can be important to such diverse
parties as family members, caretakers, professional providers, social workers,
hospitals and other institutional providers, insurers, administrators, and
ethicists. The process used might be established and varied by contract and be
sponsored by health plans, provider organizations, or consumer associations
other than the plans whose benefits are at issue. These forums could utilize any
one, or a combination of the three, decision making processes (consensus,
43 Wilder v. Northern Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (the Boren Amendment
to the Medicaid Act is enforceable in a § 1983 action for declaratory and injunctive relief
brought by healthcare providers); See also Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1984)
(ruling in favor of plaintiff's § 1983 action by holding that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services has a statutory duty under the Medicaid Act to develop and implement
a system of providing medicaid beneficiaries with the high quality of care intended
under the Act), rev'd sub nom. Estate of Smith v. O'Halloran, 930 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir.
1991); Cook v. OchsnerFound. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972) (upholding Plaintiff's§ 1983 claim against state hospitals for violations of provisions contained in the federal
Hill-Burton Act). But see Suter v. Artist M, 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) (§ 1983 is not available
to enforce a violation of a federal statute where Congress has foreclosed enforcement in
the enactment itself and "where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges,
or immunities within the meaning of § 1983"). Id. at 1366.
44 See Rosenblatt, supra note 6, at 439.
45President Clinton's proposed Health Security Act, for instance, permitted
individual patients to file claims with their health plans for payment or the provision
of services and requires the plan to notify the claimant of its determination within 30
days, together with an explanation of its decision making process. H.R. 3600 Subtitle C.
Part I, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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mediation and/or non-binding arbitration) to help bring about settlements
without formal adjudication by government administrative agencies or courts.
However, such informal mechanisms for resolving disputes need not be
mandatory or preclude administrative or judicial remedies. Their low cost,
potential for expeditious resolutions and availability to consumers unassisted
by lawyers would further the efficiency and accessibility goals of health care
reform.
B. State and Federal Administrative Process: Equity and Expertise
Additionally, or alternatively, state or federal administrative agencies can
provide similar informal procedures for the resolution of patient disputes.46
The scope of such procedures must take into account the fact that the
Constitution places some restrictions on the kinds of procedures government
agencies may use to adjudicate private interests.4 7 For instance, in disputes
between private interests and the state, the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments require that the usefulness of various procedural
elements in providing accurate decisions be weighed against their effect upon
the private interests at stake and the government's interest, including its
financial and administrative burdens.48 While notice and the opportunity for
a fair hearing is required by due process, the kind of notice, type of hearing and
timing of the hearings depend on the weighing of the interests involved.49 Like
existing administrative remedies provided in the Social Security system and
state welfare systems, these administrative forums could provide informal
hearings, tape recorded transcripts, determinations made by hearing officers,
and review within the agency.50 In suits between private parties adjudicated
before state agencies, such as Workers' Compensation Boards, similar proce-
46 Seegenerally Charles D. Grassley & Charles Pou, Jr., Congress, the Executive Branch
and The Dispute Resolution Process, 1992 J.oF DIsP. RESOL 1 (discussing dispute resolution
alternatives in administrative proceedings).
4 7See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,850-51 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589-93 (1985); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
48 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,334 (1976).
4 9Zinermon v. Burch, 494 US. 113,127-30 (1990); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)
(prisoner's post deprivation state remedies provided sufficient due process), overruled
in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), and overruled in part by Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
50See generally Margaret G. Farrell, Administrative Paternalism: Social Security's
Representative Payment Program and Two Models ofJustice, 14 CARDoZOL. REV. 283 (1992);
Farrell, Doing Unto Others, supra note 25, at 891-93. In the case of claims made under
health care reform legislation, hearing officers might be required to have special training
in health care matters.
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dures could be followed.51 Where the health policies affected need not be
nationally uniform, state agencies could provide administrative hearings
adjudicating health care claims subject to review by state courts.
However, effectuation of some substantive goals of health care reform
requires national uniformity. For instance, equal access to needed care, a major
goal of most reform proposals, would seem to require nationally uniform
standards for entitlement determinations, and only small differences in
eligibility should be tolerated among the states. On the other hand, cost
reduction, another important goal of the reform proposals, does not require
nationally uniform prices. Thus, a larger degree of variation in private and state
resolutions of claims that raise issues of cost is tolerable.
Even where nationally uniform policy is desirable, however, state agency
adjudication might be acceptable if reviewed by a federal agency or federal
district court. If the only judicial review available were state court review under
state administrative procedure acts, only the United States Supreme Court
could impose needed national uniformity by reviewing final and appealable
state court determinations. In light of the relatively few opportunities to
present issues to the Supreme Court, national uniformity must be achieved at
a lower level.
To meet the need for uniformity a federal administrative agency could be
established to review and make consistent the adjudications of state
administrative agencies, or initial jurisdiction could be vested in federal courts.
A federal agency could take several forms. The ultimate form selected could be
patterned on (1) an independent regulatory commission or board such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission, (2) an expert adjudicatory body or
Article I court similar to the Tax Court; or (3) an expert advisory body within
a cabinet agency such as the Social Security Appeals Council. All of these
administration models could use adjudicators who have special expertise in
health care issues to make initial determinations. They also permit federal
appellate court judges to bring their generalist wisdom to bear on agency
decisions through judicial review based on a substantial evidence and abuse
of discretion standard.
The values promoted by national uniformity, specialized expertise, and
formal procedures should be identified and analyzed for their congruence with
the goals of health care reform. Whether health care expertise in initial
determinations is a value that is necessary to further a specific goal of health
reform is a question that needs to be addressed before policy makers decide
whether to give de novo jurisdiction over patient claims to expert
administrative agencies or to generalist judges. For example, if an important
goal of reform is the humanization of care, then the specialized knowledge of
expert decision makers may be less important than the community norms
reflected in the views of lay decision makers such as administrative law judges,
51Cf Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), infra n. 57 (upholding Maritime Workers'
Compensation Board proceedings). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative
Courts, Administrative Agencies and Article Il1, 101 HARV. L. REv. 915 (1988).
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generalist judges, and lay juries. If, on the other hand, administrative efficiency,
physiological efficacy and successful use of high technology are important
goals, independent administrative agencies staffed by people with medical
training and expertise in health care delivery may be more desirable. In order
to protect such expert agencies from congressional and executive pressures, an
independent regulatory agency could be created to make health policy.
C. An Independent National Health Board-Unaccountable Experts
The term "independent agency" is usually used to describe an administrative
agency with a multimember board or commission whose members are
appointed by the executive and may not be removed except for cause.52
Legislative limitations on the authority of the executive to remove members at
will is seen as a means of insulating agencies from political pressures exerted
through the executive to better assure agency independence. Agencies such as
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Reserve Board and the
Interstate Commerce Commission are examples.53 There is considerable debate
among scholars and commentators about the success of independent agencies
in exercising authority free of political and other outside influences. Some
commentators believe that these independent regulators, in fact, become the
captives of those they were intended to regulate. Others find that independent
agencies become creatures of Congress and congressional committees that
influence their action through congressional oversight and budgetary
authority. Other ways in which Congress can insulate agencies from executive
influence is by exempting their budgets from review by the Office of
Management and Budget5 4 and giving agencies authority to enforce their
adjudicatory determinations directly through the courts without the approval
or participation of the Department of Justice.55
Independent agencies are often created to permit experts to render objective
decisions about complex economic and technical matters. Such agencies
typically exercise the powers of all three branches of government: rule making,
adjudication, and enforcement powers. The constitutionality of such agencies
52Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (the extent of the
President's removal powers depends upon the character of the office; the executive
office has unlimited removal power only with respect to purely executive officers and
has no removal power over non-executive officers except for one or more of the causes
enumerated in the applicable statute).
5315 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1993) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 12 U.S.C. § 41
(1993) (Federal Reserve Board).
54 See, e.g., Executive Order No. 12,291 § l(d), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 annot.; 44
U.S.C. § 3502(10). But see The Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
55Alan Morrison, How Independent are Independent Regulatory Agencies?, 1988 DUKE
L. J. 252, 254. See generally Rene Heilman, Note, Survey: Constitutional Challenges to
Independent Agency Enforcement Actions, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 423 (1988) (discussing the split of
authority in the circuit courts with respect to whether the enforcement powers of
independent agencies violate the separation of powers doctrine).
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has been upheld against claims that their authority violates the separation of
powers doctrine.5 6 Recent cases clearly establish that independent agencies
may adjudicate the rights of private parties who appear before them contesting
either agency or private action. They may constitutionally exercise their own
enforcement authority, including the issuance of cease and desist orders. 57
Therefore, it would be constitutionally permissible to establish an independent
federal board to review the administrative resolution of patient claims.
Whether the establishment of an independent national health board is
desirable depends on whether it furthers the goals of health reform. One of the
major reasons to create an independent board would be to establish an expert,
impartial adjudicator of disputes that will arise. Health care reform proposals
could provide that other policy making functions, such as establishing
budgets, defining benefits, setting quality standards, and supervising state
implementation be carried out by other agencies through their rule making
authority. When challenged or applied as the basis for enforcement actions, the
rules of other agencies could also be reviewed through adjudication by an
independent health board. Finally, disputes between federal agencies, between
federal agencies and the states, between states, between private actors
(subscribers and providers) and between the states and the federal government
could also be given initial hearing before an independent health board. If the
health board were to have only such adjudicatory authority, it would function
like an Article I court, i.e., a court created by Congress pursuant to its power
under Article I to regulate interstate commerce and spend for the public
welfare.
Such a system would be distinct from an Article Ill Court created by
Congress pursuant to its authority to create a federal judiciary comprised of
judges with lifetime tenure. Appeals from the health board or specialized
Article I court would be to a federal circuit court of appeals.5 8 There is strong
sentiment in some circles that resists the creation of specialized courts and
56 Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 602 (1935).
57FTC v. American Nat'l Cellular Inc., 810 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding FTC
enforcement powers); See also Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
afj'g 625 F. Supp. 747 (D.D.C. 1986) (upholding trial court dismissal of constitutional
challenge toauthority ofFederal Trade Commission to initiateandprosecutecomplaints
against person suspected of engaging in unfair methods of competition).
58 Due process required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments does not require
de novo adjudication of factual and legal claims by Article ll courts. Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22 (1932) (upholding federal Longshoremen's Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act provision permitting federal agency official to make determinations of law and fact
reviewable on a substantial evidence standard in the federal district courts), overruLed
inpartby Director, O.W.C.P. v. Perini N. RiverAss'n, 459 U.S. 297 (1983). Since the judges
on such a board or Article I court would not have to be given life tenure or non-reducible
salaries, theoretically their judgments would be less insulated againstbias than those of
Article M courts. Whether Article III safeguards are necessary depends on whether the
neutrality of persons who will review agency adjudication of patient health care claims
is a process value necessary to carry out the objectives of the reform.
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favors retaining and utilizing a system of generalist judges even for the
resolution of scientific disputes. 59 In the case of health care claims, the process
values of each need to be weighed against their effect on uniform goals.
D. A Board Within an Agency: Accountable Experts
Alternatively, it would be possible to create an experthealth board and house
it in an executive department rather than establish it as an independent
regulatory agency. Logically, an expert health care board would be created
under the authority of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
Housed in HHS, the board's actions, like all of the agency's actions, would be
subject to the approval of the Secretary and in that sense be advisory only.
The Social Security Board might serve as a model upon which to develop an
expert health board representing the interest of states, other concerned federal
agencies, and the public to advise the Secretary on policy matters. A separate
adjudicatory body, like the Social Security Appeals Council, might be set up
within HHS to make final determinations on health care claims appealed from
state agencies or decided initially within HHS subject only to approval of the
Secretary. This administrative model permits the exercise of expert judgment
without insulating the decision makers from responsibility to the electorate.
Agencies such as HI-IS are made accountable through the President's power to
remove the Secretary at will. Such an administrative model has the advantages
of providing a single accountable person, the Secretary of HHS, while still
providing the specialized health care expertise of the agency's staff. Whether
health care reformists choose such an administrative model should depend on
how important expertise and accountability are to the success of the programs
they propose.
E. Original Actions in the Federal Courts: Neutral, Generalist, Judges
Finally, if health care reform is enacted at the federal level, it is important for
claimants to have access to the federal courts at some point in an adjudicatory
process in order to provide uniformity where it is essential to reform goals. The
need for federal jurisdiction is suggested by several factors. First, since states
will have a major role in implementing many health care reform proposals,
individual claims against the system will often implicate legal responsibilities
of the states to comply with federal requirements in administering the
standards applicable to employers, health plans, insurers, and providers.
Second, it may be unrealistic to ask state courts to rigorously hold state
governments to federal standards, particularly standards that have significant
effect on state budgets. Finally, state courts may create conflicting state
precedents which obstruct the achievement of nationally uniform results.
59For a discussion of scientific and legal concepts of fact finding see Margaret G.
Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Epistemology and Legal Process, 15
CARDOZO L. REv. 2183, 2199-2200 (1994); Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific
Evidence, 43 EMORY L. J. 927 (1994).
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If access to federal courts is to be provided in the interest of nationally
uniform policy development, that access could be provided by either de novo
hearings before district court judges or appellate review of administrative
proceedings as discussed above. Federal district court jurisdiction can be based
on diversity of citizenship or presentation of a federal question cause of action.
A private cause of action might be expressly provided for in federal health care
reform legislation. Such a provision would negate all doubt as to the propriety
of providing federal question jurisdiction.
Even if it is not expressly granted, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter § 1983) may
provide a federal cause of action for deprivations under color of state law of
rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Whether there
is a cause of action under § 1983 to claim newly created rights to health care,
cannot be determined without an analysis of the specific health care reform
legislation in question. However, strong arguments can be made in support of
such jurisdiction.60 Unless expressly modified in reform legislation, § 1983
would likely permit individual subscribers, enrollees and patients to bring suit
in the federal courts against individuals who have, under color of state law,
deprived them of a right secured by new federal health care reform legislation.
In the past, persons seeking to secure the administrative enforcement of
federally created entitlements under the Hill-Burton Act, the Medicaid Act, the
Education of the Handicapped Act and the AFDC provisions of the Social
Security Act have relied on § 1983 to assert a private right of action not expressly
granted by the federal statutes in question.61 Under § 1983, private individuals
as well as public officials may be held personally liable so long as their actions
are taken under color of state law.6 2 Actions under color of state law for the
purposes of § 1983 include more than the actions that would constitute "state
action" for the purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendmentsa 3 and
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required before a § 1983 action
60 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), supra n.43 (the Boren
Amendment to the Medicaid Act is enforceable in a § 1983 action for declaratory and
injunctive relief brought by health care providers); But see Suter v. Artist M, 112 S. Ct.
1360, at 1370 (1992) (holding that children who were beneficiaries of the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act did not have an implied cause of action for private
enforcement of the federal act's requirement that states use "reasonable efforts" to
prevent removal of children from their homes).
61See discussion of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1984), and Cook v.
Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972), supra n. 43. See generally Rand E.
Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE
L. J. 243, 264-86 (1978).
62Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992) (holding that private parties enforcing
pre-judgment remedies acted under color of state law).
63Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-5 (1982) (articulating a three-factor test
applicable when analyzing whether the state action exists in actions under color of state
law for purposes of§ 1983 claims and thereby distinguishing the term, state action, from
that which is used when analyzing claims arising under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
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will lie.64 However, two recent Supreme Court decision have cast doubt on the
application of § 1983 to individuals claiming rights under social welfare
statutes.65
Designers of reform proposals should determine when access to federal
district court judges should be provided. Where it is thought that the adversary
process is inappropriate, that expert not generalist decision makers are needed,
or that the federal courts cannot handle the number of cases that new health
care reform legislation would spawn, modifications in the scope of § 1983
causes of action could be made. While Congress can expressly preclude implied
causes of action in the legislation and eliminate causes of action provided by
§ 1983, some constitutional questions might arise under the Due Process clause,
the Seventh Amendment guarantee of jury trials in certain cases,66 and Article
II separation of powers doctrine if individual claimants are not provided with
adequate alternative remedies.67
64Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (holding that despite the availability
of adequate state remedies § 1983 (formerly § 1979) remedies are available in addition
to any state remedies); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell
v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Swan v. Stoneman, 635 F.2d 97 (2d.
Cir. 1980).
65See discussion of Suter v. Artist M, 112 S. Ct. 1360, supra n.60; Wilder, 496 U.S. at
498 (holding that § 1983 is inapplicable if statute allegedly violated does not create
enforceable rights or if Congress foreclosed such enforcement, statute in enactment
itself).
66 Sofiev. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989). Seee.g., Mattos v. Thompson,
421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980) (holding that delays created by arbitration infringe upon the
right to trial by jury). Cf. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917)
(constitutional challenges to the workman's compensation system on the ground that it
precludes trial by jury of common law tort claims, have been unsuccessful because
workershave been held to consent to a non-jury process when they accept employment);
See generally Reynolds et. al., A Constitutional Analysis of the AMA's Medical Liability
Project Proposal, 1 CTs., HEALTH SC. & L. 58 (1990).
67Even elimination of § 1983 causes of action would not necessarily preclude
individuals from suing in the federal courts. Causes of action implied by the legislation
could be adjudicated by asserting Fifth Amendment deprivation of federal and/or state
constitutional, statutory, or common law rights without due process of law. Bivens v.
Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388,397 (1971) (upholding Plaintiff's § 1983 action for a
violation of the Fourth Amendment while seemingly grounding the Court's opinion on
the rationale that "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). This Court's rationale may arguably be
extended to include violations of the Fifth Amendment).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Recent focus on restructuring the health care system, at the state as well as
the national level, presents a unique opportunity to examine and reform
existing adjudicatory mechanisms so that they further health policy objectives.
Current procedures, including mediation, arbitration, private grievance
procedures and review boards, ethics committees, administrative processes,
judicial review, and de novo actions in federal and state courts, should be
analyzed to determine what substantive and procedural values they enhance.
Then, new processes for resolving claims should be designed that promote the
substantive values of health care reform, among them equal access,
beneficence, and efficiency. For example, procedures for settling disputes that
are available only to people with sufficient funds to hire lawyers may not be
consistent with health care reform goals of equal access to care. Similarly,
procedures that permit different policy precedents in different states may not
be consistent with health care reform objectives such as nationally uniform
benefits. The legal parameters bounding the discretion of legislators,
regulators, insurers, and providers to design dispute resolution systems can be
fairly well defined with relative ease. However, as legal academics and
bioethicists are beginning to recognize, the process values and ethical
principles that should shape that design have not been well developed.
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